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Krolczyk had not appealed this decision, the court found that Neifert
& Krolczyk were unable to demonstrate that the denial of their permits
under the 1992 Policy was the proximate cause of their lots being undevelopable.
Second, although the denial of the septic permits rendered Neifert
& Krolczyk's lots undevelopable, the denials did not constitute a taking
as there was a "nuisance exception," recognized by the Supreme Court
in Lucas, to taking when the government restricted development of a
property to prevent public harm. The court found that the operation
of an on-site septic system on Neifert & Krolczyk's lots most likely
would have contributed to the contamination problem and constituted
a nuisance; thus, there was no taking when the State denied Neifert &
Krolczyk's permits for on-site septic systems in 1979.
Finally, the court found that Neifert & Krolczyk's takings claim also
failed because Neifert & Krolczyk did not sufficiently allege that access
to sewer service was an interest that qualified as a constitutionally protected property interest. Instead, the court found that there was no
right to sewer service under either constitution, and that Neifert did
not demonstrate a property interest established by other existing rules
or state law.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Worcester County.
Patrick Greenleaf
MONTANA
Mustang Holdings v. Zaveta, 143 P.3d 456 (Mont. 2006) (holding
that the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction to
prevent an injury where the injury in question was already complete).
Mustang Holdings ("Mustang") and Marge Zaveta ("Zaveta")
owned neighboring land in Montana. For more than a century, a
creek on Mustang's property provided water via an irrigation ditch to
Zaveta's property. Although Zaveta had valid claims for water rights
associated with the ditch, the Water Court terminated those claims in
1999 for nonpayment of the claim processing fee. After Zaveta continued to divert water through the ditch, Mustang filed a complaint in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, in July 2003 seeking a
declaratory judgment that Zaveta had no right to use the ditch because
the Water Court's 1999 decision had permanently terminated Zaveta's
water rights. Zaveta offered an affirmative defense and claimed an
easement for the ditch. She subsequently paid her claim fees and the
Water Court reinstated her claims in November 2003. However, before
the district court could rule on the declaratory judgment, Mustang
bulldozed the ditch. Mustang's actions prompted Zaveta to move for a
preliminary injunction in 2005, alleging that Mustang violated a statute
prohibiting interference with a party's ditch easements. The district
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court ruled in Zaveta's favor and required Mustang to restore the
ditch.
On appeal, Mustang argued that the district court abused its discretion because none of the five statutory situations in which a court may
grant a preliminary injunction applied here. Specifically, none of the
situations addressed granting an injunction to remedy past injuries.
Because Mustang completely destroyed the ditch before Zaveta requested a preliminary injunction there was no action to enjoin. In reversing the trial court, the Montana Supreme Court also relied on
Bouma v. Bynum IrrigationDistrict. In Bouma, the court upheld the trial
court's denial of a preliminary injunction under similar circumstances
and states that "an injunction ... is to afford preventive relief only."
The court noted that the trial court had not yet made findings regarding whether Zaveta held a valid easement over Mustang's property
or if the easement was extinguished when the water rights were terminated for nonpayment of claim fees. Should Zaveta prevail in those
proceedings, she would then have a possible remedy in the form of
damages or enjoining Mustang. However, because Mustang had completed the destruction of the ditch, the preliminary injunction issued
by the district court was erroneous and constituted an abuse of its discretion. The court therefore reversed the district court's order granting Zaveta a preliminary injunction and held in favor of Mustang.
In a lengthy opinion, the dissent raised multiple arguments, including the validity of the underlying water rights, the existence of a prescriptive easement, and legislative intent on the importance of irrigation ditches. Moreover, the court distinguished the facts of this case
from those of Bouma. In Bouma, the plaintiff constructed dams in a
canal to prevent the contaminated water at issue from entering his
property prior to the court ruling on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The dissent distinguished Bouma because the contested action stopped the harm. Mustang's action of destroying the
ditch, on the other hand, caused Zaveta's harm by ceasing her access
to water. Therefore, the dissent argued, the majority erred by holding
that the remedy by injunction was not an option as enjoining Mustang
to restore the ditch would resolve the problem.
Emily Bright
NEVADA
Bacher v. Office of State Eng'r of the State of Nevada, 146 P.3d
793 (Nev. 2006) (holding that applicants can demonstrate a need to
import water through third parties, that the anti-speculation doctrine
applies in Nevada, and that the State Engineer's decisions regarding
water applications must be supported by substantial evidence).
In 1999, Primm South Real Estate Company sought, through its
agent, Vidler Water Company, an interbasin groundwater transfer

